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Introduction
In parliamentary systems elected representatives often have power to a ect resource allocations to favour their preferred areas or projects, a practice known as pork-barrel. In particular, in single member district systems, it is common to nd legislators targeting their district of election. The importance of this behaviour is di cult to quantify in this context because it potentially involves all members of Parliament and, consequently, all districts. Furthermore, it is unclear whether favouring a particular area is a source of concern since it is typically the district that the legislator has been elected to represent that bene ts from these extra resources. 1 Identifying empirically pork-barrel transfers to geographical areas presents some challenges. Given that district boundaries are generally drawn so that all districts have the same population, there is usually no variation in the strength of the connection between districts and the body that decides how funds are allocated. Empirical analyses of pork-barrel politics typically use expenditure or investment data at the electoral district level and rely on either (i) di erences in some measure of in uence of representatives such as seniority or the number of individual votes received (Golden and Picci, 2008) , (ii) over representation of certain districts relative to their population (see Atlas et al. 1995 or Knight 2008 for the US case), (iii) comparing representatives who have reached their term limit with those instead seeking re-election (Aidt and Shvets, 2012) .
In contrast, in this paper we use changes in the distribution of legislators' birthplaces and expenditure data disaggregated at the municipal level to study whether Italian members of Parliament send additional funds to their birthplace while in o ce. Using expenditure data at a more disaggregated level than electoral districts provides us with a rich source of variation to identify pork-barrel politics. More importantly, this level of detail allows us to understand whether this behaviour seeks to favour voters or to pursue other personal bene ts for the politician that are not aligned with those of her district. To this end, we exploit the fact that the birthplace of roughly half of Italian members of Parliament lies outside their electoral district.
The institutional setting in Italy, discussed in section 2, is ideal for studying pork-barrel at the municipal level. Public transfers in Italy account for as much as one quarter of the nancial needs of the 8,101 municipal administrations, and their distribution is a matter of discussion and negotiation in Parliament. Even if objective criteria for allocation are established by law, elected representatives have the possibility to divert resources towards speci c targets for electoral, partisan or other reasons. The way in which these incentives translate into geographical distributions of funds depends, among other things, on electoral rules (Lizzeri and Persico, 2001) . After the 1994 reform, Italy moved to a single member district system, which stayed 1 Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981) , however, notice that when bene ts are linked to a geographical area but costs are spread across the nation via taxation, district representatives may choose an ine ciently high level of spending because they do not internalise the costs on other districts. Battaglini and Coate (2007) point out that, in a dynamic model, this is true only under certain conditions. in place for the subsequent three elections. 2 Members of Parliament in majoritarian systems are typically re-elected within the same district, so elected representatives have strong incentives to please voters in this district (Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni, 2011) . We use the fact that Italy had a single member district system in the 1994-2006 period to isolate re-election incentives from other motives that may be driving the allocation of pork-barrel spending to municipalities.
In our sample period, Italian municipalities are grouped into 232 electoral districts for the Senate and 475 for the House, each electing only one representative. If the winner of one of these races is born in a municipality that belongs to her district of election, we classify this municipality as having an internal connection. Instead, if the winner is born in a municipality that does not belong to this district, this municipality has an external connection. This classication is useful because a politician generating an external connection with Parliament has no direct re-election interest in increasing the transfers to her birthplace, since her electoral base is elsewhere. Clearly, the same argument does not apply to the case of internal connections.
We collect data on central government transfers to municipalities for the years 1994 to 2006 to test whether connected towns receive more transfers. The fact that some towns are the birthplace of a legislator and some are not generates cross-sectional variation in the strength of the link with the Parliament that can be used for estimation. 3 In addition, parliamentary turnover generates longitudinal variation in the connection status of some municipalities, which allows us to include xed e ects. In our baseline estimates, identi cation of the e ect of having a connection in Parliament is then obtained by comparing the same town when it is connected and when it is not, thus removing all xed unobservable municipal-level factors.
In section 4 we show that municipalities with an external connection receive yearly roughly 2% more transfers per capita than other municipalities, while no increase is found for internal connections. Over a legislature, this amounts to about 1 million Euro for a municipality of 50,000 inhabitants. This result cannot be explained by re-election incentives alone because, by de nition, the municipality of birth of external politicians lies outside their electoral district.
Given that these incentives have been the typical explanation given for distributional policies in the literature, documenting that pork-barrel spending can arise for other reasons is one of the main contributions of this paper. We nd no e ect for internal connections, even if, for them, the municipality of birth is part of their electorate.
One reason explaining the discrepancy in our results between externals and internals is related to the trade-o between favouring their district -hence helping their re-election chances -and securing transfers to their town of birth for personal reasons. 4 We provide evidence of This trade-o may be di erent for internal and external politicians. Internal politicians are more likely to have local level experience -as, for instance, town mayors or council members -while externals have more parliamentary and government experience, and are generally national party members. Moreover, by de nition the birthplace of internals is surrounded by other municipalities that also belong to the politician's district. As a consequence, internal politicians may have weaker incentives to favour their town over others, since they are subject to stricter voters' control and are already well established local gures. On the other hand, these issues play less of a role for externals, whose birth town is outside their district of election.
In Section 5 we consider several possible explanations for the fact that municipalities with an external connection in Parliament receive more transfers. A career in Parliament is not the only goal of a politician and this is especially true in Italy, where turnover often exceeds 50 percent. Politicians might use transfers to their birth town as a way to improve their prospects of a career in the local administration after serving in Congress. We identify those parliamentarians who ran for o ce in their birthplace after exiting Parliament, and test whether these connections generate larger increases in transfers. An external connection through a politician later having a post-congressional career at the local level is associated with 11.9 more Euros per capita each year to the municipality of birth relative to other externals. No additional e ect is found in the case of internals. In fact, using transfers as a way to become more popular might be especially relevant for external politicians who, being less known locally, have stronger incentives to show interest in the birth town. On the other hand, internals have less to win and more to lose. They have less to win because they usually have substantially more experience at the local level and do not need to obtain more notoriety; and they have more to lose because voters from neighbouring towns might punish favouring the birth town over others in the district.
We then explore whether birth town bias is due to the presence of personal connections in the municipality of birth. One of these connections arises when the local mayor and the parliamentarian belong to the same party. In this case, members of the Parliament may follow party guidelines and divert money to their birthplaces when they are aligned. We nd that internal connections with an aligned mayor are associated with substantially more transfers to their birth town, whereas for externals the evidence is much weaker. Another type of personal connection is generated when the family or friends of an elected representative live in the birth town. In an attempt to capture these links, we test whether connected towns whose mayor shares the last name with a member of the Parliament receive more transfers than other municipalities, nding no evidence supporting this hypothesis.
Finally, we run a series of placebos and robustness checks in section 6 to assess the validity of our results. We construct dummies analogous to the ones used for our main speci cation but which capture connections that should, in principle, have no e ect on transfers. Speci cally, we rst use an indicator for the municipality being the birthplace of a runner-up in one of the district elections. Then, we do the same for members of the regional (as opposed to national) Parliament and con rm that, as expected, none of those connections yields extra transfers. We also check that our estimates are robust to changing the accounting de nition of our dependent variable and to estimating the model in logarithms. We interpret these results as evidence that our ndings are not driven by confounding factors correlated with the connection status of municipalities.
Our results suggest that, overall, politicians' decisions are shaped by motives that extend beyond being re-elected. In this sense, our work is an empirical contribution to the literature on the determinants of politicians' decisions. Traditional models assume that re-election concerns (Downs, 1957) or policy preferences (Wittman, 1983) are the main drivers of politicians' decisions. Recently, however, Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2005) and Keane and Merlo (2010) emphasize that the political career is a long process of which serving in Parliament is only a step. Because politicians are rational economic agents, they make career decisions by comparing alternative choices. 5 Members of Parliament typically come from the national party ranks, local politics or the private sector, and similarly may return to one of these occupations after o ce or to continue working elsewhere. The choices they make are therefore inherently forward-looking, as serving in Congress and actions as a legislator may a ect future career prospects. Our empirical results, hence, provide reduced-form evidence on the importance of personal motives in representatives' decisions while in o ce.
The Italian institutional setting

Municipalities
At the time of the 2001 Census, Italy had 8,101 municipalities (comuni). The main sources of revenue for municipal governments are transfers from the national and regional governments, in order to cover part of their running costs and investment projects, tax collection, building permits, provision of public services and fees. The mayor is the head of the municipal committee (Giunta, the executive body), and is also part of the town council (Consiglio comunale), which has legislative powers. Municipalities are grouped into 110 provinces and 20 regions, the most important sub-national administrative units. Five of them are granted special powers due to their peculiar nature: Valle d'Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige, Friuli-Venezia Giulia (which are all bordering foreign countries and home to language minorities) and the two islands, Sardegna and Sicilia.
The Parliament and the allocation of transfers
The national Parliament is composed of 945 elected legislators and is one of the largest in the world. The lower house, (Camera dei Deputati) has 630 representatives, while the Senate (Senato) is smaller with just 315. A complete legislature lasts for ve years although it is not uncommon that a government crisis results in new elections being held beforehand. In fact, 5 Samuels (2002) makes a similar point and argues that politicians have "progressive ambition" which goes beyond immediate re-election, and present evidence for the Brazilian case. in the 1994-2006 period of our sample there was one incomplete legislature that lasted for two years (1994) (1995) (1996) and two complete ones (1996-2001 and 2001-2006) .
The part of state transfers to municipalities that covers ordinary running costs is determined by law on the basis of municipality's population, surface and density, age composition, previous expenses and the presence or not of a military base (see Decreto Legislativo n. 504/1992). Another part is meant to nance expenses for public works of primary socioeconomic interest and to foster convergence of under-endowed municipalities and is arguably more discretionary.
The mentioned legal criteria specify guidelines for determining the transfers each municipality is entitled to, but the e ective amount is determined every year in the budget law and approved by the Parliament in the last days of December. This law details the total amount and destination of public spending, and sparks an intense debate both in the Parliament and press during the whole time between discussion and approval. The budgetary process has been repeatedly questioned both from the press and the political world itself mostly because parliamentarians often sponsor the allocation of additional government transfers to nance personal projects at the local level. 6 
The electoral law
Transfers to municipalities
Transferring resources to municipalities is the responsibility of the Italian Ministry of Internal A airs, and disaggregated data are available at the Ministry's website. Valle d'Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige, Friuli-Venezia Giulia are special autonomous regions and the funding of their municipalities follows di erent rules. We also exclude the capital, Rome. 8 For this reason, 6 The fact that the budget law was used by politicians to pass various pork-barrel projects has been a well known fact for decades. Once a former prime minister, Massimo D'Alema, described this process in these terms: "The Parliament becomes the most squalid suq [a bazaar] at the moment of assigning funds in the budget law". 7 Single member district systems are generally regarded as favouring the individual pro les of parliamentarians, and this was also the case in Italy (Cotta and Verzichelli, 2007) . 8 Rome, together with a few other large municipalities, are always the birth town of at least one parliamentarian, so that their connection status has no variation over time.
we exclude them from our analysis. This leaves us with a dataset of 15 ordinary regions plus Sardinia and Sicily, containing a total of 7,470 municipalities in 1994.
Transfers are divided into current transfers, intended to cover basic running costs, and capital transfers, destined to nance investments. The aggregate amount of government transfers has declined over time, and in 2005 it accounted for slightly more than 12 billion Euros (0.8% of GDP). Looking at the distribution of transfers across municipalities reveals substantial heterogeneity, even in per capita terms. Municipalities in mountainous and southern areas receive more money per capita, whereas in the north and especially in the river Po valley transfers are lower (see gure A.1a in the appendix). Determinants of this heterogeneity are in large part population density and economic development di erences, and some areas also bene t from higher bene ts to cover costs for national interest infrastructures.
The dependent variable we use in the empirical analysis is total transfers, in 2005 Euros per capita, excluding past mortgage payments. Mortgage payments are excluded because they are funds that the central government sends to municipalities to pay instalments of old mortgages, taken before 1992. These transfers represent a small fraction of the total and are not manipulable.
Data on representatives and local level politicians
We also gathered information on all members of the national Parliament for the 1994-2006 period. Information on birthplace, date of birth and party is complemented with personal characteristics of politicians from Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni (2010) . In gure A.1b, in the appendix, we show the geographic distribution of birthplaces of parliamentarians elected in 1996. A large number is from the capital, Rome, and, not surprisingly, from other large cities like Turin, Milan, Genoa or Naples. Still, there are several smaller municipalities which are also connected to Parliament.
Other political and geographical variables
Geographical, demographic and economic characteristics are important to determine the amount of transfers the state decides to allocate to each municipality. In our analysis we control for these factors using information on population, surface and density of the municipality and altitude of the city centre. We also use an indicator for the presence of a military base. In order to control for the political orientation of voters in each municipality, we also collect data on the vote share received by the national government coalition at the municipal level plus information on the party of the mayor. More details on data sources are provided in the Appendix.
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of table 1 presents a series of characteristics of Italian municipalities, grouped by legislature. Municipalities are small (around 7,000 inhabitants on average), with a mean surface of a little more than 40 km 2 and a slowly increasing population density that reached 248.2 inhabitants per square kilometre in the 2001 legislature. About 6.5% of municipalities have, on average, at least one connection with Parliament.
Panel B reports descriptives for all members of the Italian Parliament, divided in internalsthose who were elected in a district that includes the birth town -externals, who were elected in a district that does not include their birth town -and proportionally elected parliamentarians. Members of the Parliament are relatively old (around 50 years old on average), predominantly men and well paid, with an average gross income of above 110,000 Euros. Self-reported information on political careers pins down one important di erence between internals and externals: the former are more likely to be politicians with a long standing experience at the local level, either as elected o cials or as members of the party structure. On the other hand, externals are more likely to be national level gures: besides being 8.5 percent more likely to have been national party member in the past, they also have more experience in the Parliament (0.6 more years on average) and are 1.8% more likely to have been members of the national government.
Empirical analysis
Parliamentarians seeking re-election are typically thought to have incentives to divert public resources to their district. But they may also have an interest in distributing these resources unevenly inside the district, for example by reserving a special treatment to their municipality of birth. After elections, politicians may retain links with their birthplace -for example through acquaintances, relatives, or party colleagues -that can a ect their behaviour in ofce. 9
The main objective of this section is to study empirically whether politicians favour their birthplaces in the allocation of transfers. Given that the relationship between a politician and her birthplace may di er if this municipality lies within the district of election or not, we need to take this into account in our analysis. An internal politician, who is elected in a district that includes her municipality of birth, may have a birth town bias because voters there are part of her electorate. But for an external politician, for whom the birthplace lies outside the district of election, this is not necessarily the case because none of her voters live there.
We de ne a municipality as connected if it is the birthplace of a member of Parliament. This is the approach we follow below.
Another possibility would be to exploit cross-sectional variation in the connection variables using a regression discontinuity design (RDD). This approach would compare transfers to birthplaces of candidates who won the district race by a small margin with transfers to birthplaces of close losers (Lee 2008, Lee and Lemieux 2010) . Implementing an RDD in our case is, however, problematic. First, the units of observation are municipalities and not politicians and often a municipality is the birthplace of both winners and losers. In the treatment e ect terminology, such municipalities belong to both the treatment and control groups. One solution would be to restrict the sample to birthplaces of either one winner or one loser, but this would reduce the number of observations substantially. 10 This problem is aggravated even further when trying to provide separate estimates for internal and external connections. Finding close races that only involve internal or external candidates reduces the sample size to a point in which it is hard to draw any meaningful statistical inference. For these reasons, we choose not to pursue this strategy.
Baseline speci cation and results
In our baseline speci cation we consider a regression of government transfers per capita on three connection dummies, as de ned above, and a set of controls:
where β 1 measures the extra yearly transfers per capita that a municipality receives on average for being the birth town of an external representative in the Parliament while β 2 and β 3 capture the e ect for internal and proportional representatives, respectively. We use lags instead of contemporaneous values because transfers for t are determined in the budget law at the end of the previous year. As usual, x is a vector of controls, δ is a conformable vector of parameters and u it is a random disturbance term that comprises all the determinants of transfers that are unobserved.
The choice of controls is guided by the criteria for allocation of transfers to municipalities contained in the 1992 law we described in section 2. In particular, we include a third degree polynomial in population, a set of dummies for each population band, lagged population density, surface in hundreds of square hectometres, a dummy taking value one if the municipality has a military base and a dummy taking value one if the municipality is a province capital. We also include an indicator that equals one if the most voted party in the last parliamentary elections in municipality i belongs to the coalition governing at the national level. This variables is meant to control for the possibility that the majority coalition in the Parliament may decide to allocate additional transfers to municipalities that strongly supported them in the previous elections.
Depending on the speci cation, the disturbance term u it is allowed to include year, region or year-region dummies in order to capture xed or time-varying regional e ects (e.g. differences between southern and northern regions or changes in political orientation as well as di erences in business or political cycles). In most speci cations we also include municipalityspeci c xed e ects to capture time-invariant di erences across municipalities. In these cases we use the longitudinal dimension of our dataset and use the within groups estimator. Identication of the coe cients of interest then comes from time variation in the connection dummies induced by parliamentary turnover alone. 11
The inclusion of xed e ects allows us to control for determinants of transfers that are potentially correlated with having a connection. For example, some municipalities may have stronger local party structures which increase both their political clout and their chances of being the birthplace of a member of Parliament. Likewise, a municipality may be a cultural hub, receiving more funds for cultural matters and at the same time having both an increased civil society participation and a higher probability of being connected. Reverse causality could also be an issue if, for example, municipal governments that have historically received more transfers are more likely to place a local politician in the national party lists. These issues would be solved by the xed e ect speci cation under the assumption that the relevant confounding factors are xed over the sample period.
In columns 1 to 4 of table 2 we present estimation results with di erent sets of time, re- absorb common shocks and di erent regional trends in spending.
One potential issue with using the within-groups estimator in this context is that the connection dummies exhibit scarce longitudinal variation in the majority of municipalities. This Having an internal politician in Parliament does not seem to a ect transfers signi cantly, as the coe cient for the internal connection is very close to zero. Proportional connections are, instead, positively associated with transfers but the coe cient is imprecisely estimated (this may be due to the fact that only one quarter of the Parliament is elected in the proportional quota). For the within groups estimates, the hypothesis of equality between the coe cient for internal and external connections nds little support, with p-values of 0.02, 0.05 and 0.10 in columns 2, 3 and 4, respectively. We interpret this result and the di erence in point estimates as evidence of a di erent e ect of internal and external connections. On the other hand, in the 12 A few cities are so large that had to be divided into several districts, so that de ning a connection in such cases is potentially ambiguous. We address this issue by collapsing multiple districts into one that corresponds to the municipal boundaries. As a robustness check, we also ran all estimations again by dropping all multi-district cities, and results are una ected.
case of proportional and external connections we cannot reject the hypothesis of equality of coe cients (p-values range from 0.4 to above 0.7). We will come back to the interpretation of these coe cients later. 13 
Internal and external politicians: di erent incentives
The typical explanation for pork-barrel spending in the literature is that politicians that want re-election have geographically concentrated incentives to please their district (Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen 1981, Aidt and Shvets 2012) . It is then natural to ask whether our results are driven by di erences in the electoral incentives of internal and external politicians. In our period of study roughly half of the Parliament was re-elected in each legislature. Among those re-elected in the majoritarian quota, around 83% did so in the same electoral district. If we look at transitions between internal, external and proportional statuses we see that 80% of externals remain externals, about 17% go into the proportional quota, and only 3% become internals. 14 Given that re-election in other districts is rare, favouring voters in the current district appears to be a reasonable strategy to pursue.
A consequence of this argument, however, is that electoral incentives are an unlikely explanation for our ndings, as it is externals that are associated with additional resources to 13 For completeness, we also run the same regressions using, instead of binary indicators, a variable that counts the number of connections and a speci cation with dummies for having 1, 2-3 and 4 or more connections. Results are in line with our preferred speci cation and are available upon request. 14 Similar gures hold for internals with 77% remaining internals, 17% becoming proportionals and roughly 6% becoming externals.
their birthplace, and this birthplace lies outside their district of election. For internal politicians we nd no e ect, despite the fact that their birth town does belong to their district. This is not particularly surprising if we bear in mind that the municipality of birth generally only accounts for a small fraction of the district's population, and electoral incentives for an internal politician may discourage her from favouring her birthplace.
The Trade-o between Electoral Incentives and Birth-Town Bias
In order to investigate the interplay between re-election incentives and the birth town bias documented above we study how the estimated e ects vary across the electoral cycle. Electoral incentives are likely to be especially pressing towards the end of the legislature when voters' attention rises. 15 By interacting our connection variables with indicators for being in the rst or in the last year of the term we can test for the existence of a cycle in transfers.
The rst year dummy takes value one in election years (that is in 1994, 1996 and 2001),
while last year is one in 2000 and 2005. 16 When we include, in column 2, only the interactions for last year of the term, we see that spending is remarkably reduced in the last years compared to the rest of the legislature. The negative sign of the interaction terms and the magnitude of the coe cients suggest that the transfers received by all connected municipalities drop to the level of unconnected ones in the pre-election years. In the last column we include all interactions, and the coe cients maintain the signs although they slightly vary in magnitude.
The main conclusion that can be drawn from this exercise is that the birth town bias is substantially reduced in the years preceding elections, possibly because politicians increase transfers only when re-election in Parliament is not an immediate concern. This suggests that the politician faces a trade-o between pushing to send pork to her birthplace and working to please her electorate. This trade-o can be seen as a particular case of the one at the heart of the career concerns models in Persson and Tabellini (2002) , where politicians need to choose between extracting rents to their personal bene t and supplying a public good, to please voter and be re-elected. Even if internals and externals share the same preference for sending money 15 This would be a case of an opportunistic spending cycle, in which politicians may manipulate public policy in order to increase their chances of re-election. For evidence on this, see, e.g. Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) or, in the Italian context, Repetto (2015) and Alesina and Paradisi (2014) . 16 Given that the 1994 term ended unexpectedly, we do not consider 1995 as the last year of the legislature (its dummy is set to zero). Including it, however, leaves results qualitatively unchanged. Also, repeating the exercise using the rst two and last two of the legislature (instead of just one) leads to very similar results. To further investigate this point, we inspect the legislative activity of internals and externals. We complement our data on Parliament members with the dataset used in Marangoni and Tronconi (2011) , which includes information on the number of private member bills that each politician presented as rst signer disaggregated into those that are directed to i) any Italian region, ii) her region of election and iii) her region of birth. 17 Those bills rarely become law but 17 Notice that bills are classi ed at the regional level, so that we are not able to tell whether bills were targeted to a speci c birthplace or to other municipalities within the region of election. For this reason we exclude from our analysis those externals that are elected inside their region of birth. Data are available only for the Camera and for the 1996 and 2001 legislatures. are used by parliamentarians as a way to take position and as a signal to their constituency of their daily work. We report tabulations for these variables separating internals and externals in In panel B we report p-values for mean comparison tests for the share of regional bills sponsored by externals that are directed to their region of birth (12.25%). In the Unweighted line we report the p-value of a t-test of the null that this number is statistically different from 5%. In the Population weighted line, instead, we compare the share of birth region bills with the share of Italian population living in that region, and test the null that the di erence between the two is zero. Source of legislative data: Marangoni and Tronconi (2011) .
The average number of bills sponsored per term is comparable in both categories, but there are di erences in the target of these bills. Internals sponsor more regional bills and more bills directed to their region of election (and birth) than externals. Of all sponsored bills, internals devote a larger fraction to their region of election. In the second column we see that in their legislative activity externals target both their region of election and, interestingly, their region of birth, with as much as 12.25% of all regional bills they sponsor. However, given that Italy has 20 regions, if politicians sponsor several regional bills during a legislature, some might be directed to the region of birth by mere chance even if no targeting was planned. To test whether there is evidence of externals deliberately targeting their birth region over others we perform two statistical tests. In the rst case (unweighted) we compare the observed gure with 5% -i.e. the value that one would expect if externals target bills randomly across the 20 Italian regions. In the second test (population weighted) we compare the share of bills to the region of birth to the share of Italian population living in that region. 18 This procedure aims to take into account that larger regions are more likely to be targeted. The p-values for these statistical tests are reported in panel B of table 4. In both cases, at the 10% level we reject the null that the observed gure is the result of chance. We interpret these results as evidence that externals disproportionately target their region of birth in legislative e orts, which is consistent with the birth town bias in transfers documented in the baseline results of table 2.
District Level Analysis
If the amount of resources available for distributing pork is limited and internals are more concerned about their district of election, districts that elected an external politician might receive, on average, less transfers than the ones represented by an internal. In order to test this hypothesis we aggregate transfers at the district level for both the Camera and the Senato. We then regress transfers per capita on an indicator that equals one if the district is represented by an external politician, separately for each chamber. We add as controls a cubic in population, density, surface and di erent sets of time or region-time dummies. After dropping special regions and multi-district cities such as Milan, Palermo and Rome, we are left with 364 districts for the Camera and 187 for the Senato.
Since each district is necessarily represented by either an internal or an external politician, the coe cient on ext.connect can be interpreted as the conditional e ect of having elected an external on transfers.
We see in table 5 that municipalities in districts that elected an external representative in the Camera receive between 12.6 and 24.2 less Euros per capita in government transfers each
year (for the OLS speci cations, columns 1-3), and the same pattern is found for the Senate.
Given the very small time series variation (few districts switch from an internal to an external in the sample), however, when we include district xed e ects the estimated coe cients are not signi cantly di erent from zero at conventional levels.
This result provides some additional evidence in favour of the hypothesis that internals may be more focused on favouring their district of election than externals. Moreover, if we also consider that we nd birth town bias for externals and not for internals, it is consistent with both types of politicians standing in di erent points of the trade-o between re-election incentives and birth town bias.
As the results in this section suggest, re-electoral incentives cannot explain the observed birth town bias. Moreover, favouring the district of election and the town of birth seem to be competing objectives, each being more or less pressing in di erent years of the term and among di erent types of politicians. In particular, pleasing the district's voters seems to be more compelling for internals than for externals as argued above and shown in Table 5 . Given that re-election incentives are an unlikely explanation for our ndings, the following section is devoted to investigating possible alternative mechanisms.
Mechanisms
This section explores possible mechanisms behind the birth town bias. We consider two potential channels. First, we investigate the role of post-congressional careers of members of the Parliament, and then we consider the e ect of personal connections in their birth towns on transfer decisions.
Post-congressional career
In each election between 1994 and 2006, about half of the Parliament was renewed. High turnover has historically forced many parliamentarians to seek a career after Congress. As Merlo et al. (2008) show, 44.2 percent of all legislators in their sample for post-war Italy continued in politics after exiting Parliament, and more than one third of them were elected at the local level (town, province or region).
In light of this, legislators may divert transfers to their birth town as a way to improve their prospects of a local career at the municipal level. A direct test of the link between post-congressional career concerns and transfers is infeasible because meaningful measures of popularity at the local level are generally unavailable. Yet, there is at least one veri able implication: parliamentarians who are interested in taking a position in their birth town later should be the ones who most actively a ect transfers while in o ce.
We collect data on all elected o cials at the town level -that is, mayors, vice-mayors and members of the council, as well as mayoral candidates -for the period 1994-2014 and match them with our legislators' data using full name, year and town of birth. 19 Around 10.9% of the members of the Parliament pursued a post-congressional career in the birth town according to our de nition. Roughly 18.7% of internals go back to the birth town, as opposed to only 4.7% of externals and 9.8% of proportionals. This di erence does not necessarily re ect di erences in preferences but may simply be the result of the fact that internals, who are also much more likely to have a pre-congressional career at the local level, are better known in the birth town and have easier access to connections.
In order to test whether our results are driven by future career concerns, we add to our baseline speci cation interactions of our connection dummies with indicators that equal one when the corresponding connection is driven by at least one legislator with post-congressional experience in their birthplace. In our de nition a politician has post-congressional experience if, after exiting Parliament for the rst time, she goes back to the birth town and runs for mayor or is elected as committee member or town councillor.
Estimation results are presented in the rst column of table 6, in which we estimate our baseline model with time e ects only. 20 Results are consistent with the career concerns hypothesis: externals with a subsequent post-congressional career are associated with 11.9 more transfers to the birth town than other externals. The positive coe cients suggest that externals with a subsequent career at the local level are more actively transferring resources to their birthplace while in o ce.
In the baseline results, internals do not appear to divert transfers home and the additional e ect for those who later pursue a post-congressional career at the local level is also indistinguishable from zero. This may be explained by the fact that -even if internals and externals had the same preference for sending money home -internals might face a higher electoral cost of favouring their municipality relative to externals, for whom the birth town is outside the district of election. Moreover, internal politicians are already well established local gures and, hence, may not need to further improve their popularity at the local level.
While this empirical speci cation is the best we can do given the available data, it has some limitations that a ect the interpretation of the results. The experience variable is obtained using ex post information on realized transitions of legislators to local governments. However, the decision to transfer funds to the birthplace is taken previously, when the legislator does not know when she will be leaving Parliament and whether she will pursue a career at the local level at all. Furthermore, for some politicians the career in Congress was still not over in 19 Although it is possible that there are politicians with coinciding name, year and town of birth in our dataset, we believe that mismatches using this algorithm are rare. The data on mayoral candidates do not include information on neither the year nor the municipality of birth so the matching for candidates is done using the full name only. 20 To investigate mechanisms, in this section we have to further split connections into small groups, hence reducing even more the variation in the data. For this reason, we choose not to include region-time interactions in any of the speci cations. Once including region-time interactions, although signs are preserved, the magnitudes are generally smaller and statistical signi cance is sometimes lost.
2014, when our sample ends. Therefore, our local experience variables are only a proxy for the intention of the politician to go back to her birthplace and point estimates of the interaction terms may be downward biased.
Personal ties
There are several possible explanations behind the birth town bias other than career concerns. For example, politicians may have a personal connection to interested parties in their town of birth. One type of interested party is the local mayor. Members of the Parliament might be more inclined towards sending resources home if the mayor is of her same party.
To see whether being aligned with parliamentarians helps municipal governments to secure additional transfers we construct, for each type of connection, an indicator that equals one if municipality i has at least one connection in year t -1 belonging to the same party as the mayor in o ce. The three indicators are then added to our estimating equation 1. Results are reported in column 2 of table 6. Due to the widespread presence of independent candidates who run at the local level without the support of national parties, the number of aligned municipalities in the sample is relatively small. 21 In fact, of all connected towns, only 8.3%-34.9% (depending on the year) of all municipalities are aligned. Estimates reveal that internals are associated with substantially more transfers to their birth town when this town is aligned with at least one parliamentarian. Speci cally, internal connections favour their birth town with roughly 15 Euros per capita each year if the mayor belongs to their same political party, a coe cient that is more than three times larger than the baseline e ect found for external connections and is almost 7% of the sample mean. No additional e ect is found for external (and proportional) connections when the mayor of their town is aligned.
A possible explanation that reconciles this result with the fact that we nd no birth town bias for internal connections is that internals may nd acceptable to pay the electoral cost that comes from favouring a town over others only when they are aligned with the ruling party. Internals are more experienced at the local level and more likely to be part of the local level party administration, as show in table 1 of section 3. Furthermore, they are often politicians who rose from being local gures to sitting in Parliament, and they may be willing to acknowledge their electoral base and the party for their support by helping the mayor and her government with additional resources.
Another type of personal connection politicians may have is friends, family, or other acquaintances, such as members of the local party structure that helped them reach the Parliament. Testing whether the birth town bias is related to this type of personal connections is challenging because most of this network of relationships is unobservable. To try to obtain some evidence on this hypothesis we construct, for internals, externals and proportional connections an indicator that is equal to one if a municipality is the birth town of at least one member of the Parliament in o ce that has the same surname of the current mayor. This In column 3 of table 6 we show that municipalities whose mayor shares the same last name with at least one member of the Parliament do not appear to receive additional transfers.
Although the estimated e ect for the external connections is positive, the little variation in this variables renders the point estimates statistically indistinguishable from zero, so that this exercise brings no evidence in favour of an additional e ect of sharing the same name with the mayor. 23
In the last column of the table we include all the interactions discussed before to see whether one mechanism prevails over the other. Results are in line with the separate estimations, suggesting that post-congressional careers and party alignment both play a role in the allocation decisions of members of Parliament. This section also sheds light on the interpretation of the baseline result for externals by showing that an important driver of these politicians' decisions could be their post congressional career concerns.
Placebos and robustness checks
While the municipality e ects deal with xed unobservable di erences, it is still possible that time-varying shocks which a ect both transfers and the political in uence of a municipality bias the baseline estimates in table 2. The idea of the placebos we propose below is to use variables that may be correlated to a municipality's political salience but that are not directly related to the budgetary process.
First, we use data on elections outcomes to pin down the identity and the birth town of runners-up in all single member district votes. In a single member district election there is always a winner, who takes a seat in Parliament, and one or more losers. We construct a dummy variable, false ext. connect, analogously to ext. connect but taking value one when a municipality is the birthplace of at least one runner-up instead of a winner. Suppose that a municipality is a ected by some shock that improves its political visibility. This shock simultaneously increase the amount of transfers received and possibly also the probability that a politician born there stands for Parliament. While this co-movement would bias our baseline estimates, it would also induce a positive correlation between false ext. connect and transfers as long as the runner-up dummy is also a ected by the political visibility shock. Following this argument, we replace our connection variables with the ones constructed using runners-up instead of winners and estimate the model again. The negative and statistically insigni cant coe cient estimates for both of these indicators in column 1 of table 7 reassuringly suggest that our results are not driven by the time varying political weight of di erent municipalities.
A similar intuition motivates our second placebo test. We use a dummy reg. connect taking value one if municipality i is the birthplace of a politician elected in a regional (as opposed to 22 In the period covered by our sample, the two o ces were not incompatible, see Testo Unico degli Enti Locali (D.lgs. 267/2000), lemma 63. 23 Using an indicator taking value one when the mayor is a member of parliament yields very similar results. national) Parliament. As with the previous placebo, a signi cant coe cient here would point to some confounding factor driving both transfers and the probability of having a connection as there is no plausible way through which regional legislators may a ect national transfers directly. In column 2 of table 7 we show that having a regional connection, as expected, has no impact on central government transfers.
In the years prior to 1992 municipalities were allowed to take on mortgage debt that was later assumed by the central government. The instalments of this debt were paid yearly through transfers to the municipality for the corresponding amount. 24 After the system ceased to exist transfers went on for the following years to complete the payment of outstanding mortgages. In our third placebo we use these transfers as our dependent variable. In column 3 of table 7 we show that our connection variables have no e ect on this type of transfers.
Our nal placebo changes the dependent variable to ordinary transfers (fondo ordinario).
These are part of our total transfers variable but are destined to nance current expenditures and are arguably harder to manipulate. Column 4 of table 7 con rms this hypothesis by showing that our connection variables have indeed a small and insigni cant e ect on ordinary transfers. Note that the R 2 of the regression is substantially higher than before, meaning that the control variables suggested by the transfers law criteria (e.g. population, density etc.) do a much better job in explaining the variation in ordinary transfers than do for total transfers.
We now proceed to test the robustness of our baseline results by considering three variations of the original model. In the rst place we estimate the model using the logarithm of transfers per capita as our dependent variable. The log speci cation is more robust to outliers and changes the interpretation of the time e ects from xed amount to proportional changes. Our second robustness check includes the runner-up and regional connection variables false ext connect, false int connect and reg connect as controls in the baseline speci cation.
Finally, we estimate a model in which connections are divided into regular connections (as de ned above) and connections that are members of a "key" commission in the Parliament.
With this speci cation we want to check whether more in uential (or simply better positioned) politicians are more capable to manipulate transfers. Data on commission a liation for each legislator were obtained from Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni (2010) . In the period considered there were 15 active commissions composed of about 15-27 members in the Senato and 35-90 in the Camera. The overwhelming majority of Italian legislators participated in at least one commission in any given legislature. These commissions have considerable in uence in shaping the legislative agenda in their subject area. Given that we are interested in identifying those legislators with particular impact in local level nance we restrict our attention to public budget, public nance, public works, agriculture, and transportation, which will form our "key commissions" group. 25 24 These are called the fondo sviluppo investimenti. Recall that we excluded those transfers from our main dependent variable de nition, see section 2. 25 It is not entirely clear how to select the commissions that deal with matters related to transfers and local gov- Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is transfers from the central government. In column 3 the dependent variable is transfers for past mortgages, whereas in column 4 we use ordinary tranfers. All quantities are in 2005 Euros per capita. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the municipality level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The results for these robustness checks are presented in table 8. In column 1 we see that the log speci cation yields very similar results to those presented before, with external connections increasing transfers per capita by 1.62 percent. Column 2 shows that point estimates for the connection variables are essentially una ected by the inclusion of the runner-up and regional connection dummies as controls. Finally, column 3 indicates that a large part of the estimated e ect of legislators on transfers operates through members of key commissions, as expected. This result, although predictable, suggests that it is indeed legislators' actions and not municipal-level unobservables that are behind our main results.
Conclusions
In this paper we use data on government transfers at the municipal level to study if the birth towns of Italian members of Parliament are favoured in budgetary allocations. By using the town of birth as the link between geographical areas and political institutions, we exploit ernment from the ones that discuss other technical or legislative issues. While the choice will always involve a certain degree of arbitrariness, we believe that we are on the safe side excluding the constitutional a airs, environment, foreign a airs, industry, justice, employment, European Union, health, defence and culture commissions. Casual inspection of the activity of those commissions reveals that it is unrelated with municipal issues. a di erent source of variation from those used in previous analyses of pork-barrel politics.
This level of disaggregation, together with the single member district system in place in Italy, allows us to disentangle electoral motives from other possible drivers of birth town bias.
In order to study how electoral incentives shape allocation decisions, we divide politicians into those having their birthplace within their district of election (internals) and those having their birthplace elsewhere (externals). We observe that municipalities connected to Parliament through an external receive roughly 2 percent larger yearly per capita transfers. Given that the birth town bias appears to be driven only by externals and that these politicians have no electoral incentives to favour their birthplace, we conclude that re-election incentives cannot be driving our results. These incentives are the typical explanation for distributional policies in the literature, thus documenting that pork-barrel spending can arise for other reasons is one of the main contributions of this paper.
We then turn to study other possible incentives to favour the birthplace. First, we argue that post-congressional career considerations by incumbent legislators explain at least part of our results. By increasing transfers while in o ce, politicians may be able to improve their chances of being elected at the local level after exiting Parliament. Using data on politicians' career pro les, we nd an additional e ect of external parliamentarians who later ran for a local o ce. Then, we explore whether the presence of personal ties in the birth town could provide an alternative mechanism. In order to capture these links, we consider both alignment between the parliamentarian and the mayor along party lines and the existence of family links, captured by the legislator sharing the last name with the mayor. While we nd that party alignment can play a role for internal politicians, it does not appear to be a relevant mechanism for externals. Finally, we do not nd evidence in favour of an e ect of family links between the politician and the local mayor. 
